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meta-ethical	 theories.	Concerning	normative	moral	 theories,	 a	major	ethical	 tradi-
tion	 is	 virtue	 ethics—the	 view	 that	 character	 and	 behavioral	 dispositions	 are	 of	
primary	 normative	 significance	 in	 ethical	 deliberation,	 and	 not	 particular	 actions.	
Typically,	philosophers	within	this	tradition	have	emphasized	the	necessity	of	moral	
education	and	character	cultivation.	Nevertheless,	there	are	a	variety	of	distinct	po-
sitions	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 ‘virtue	 ethics’	 that	 have	manifested	 in	 cultures	 that	






(e.g.	Sherif,	 1975;	Bucar,	2014,	2018;	Attaran,	2015).	According	 to	 this	 interpreta-
tion,	moral	perfection	is	attainable	only	after	battling	with	and	overcoming	the	ego	
[Nafs].	This	view	holds	that	all	vice	is	rooted	in	the	ego,	thus	the	Sufi	tradition	offers	
a	unified	and	hierarchal	account	of	 the	nature	of	vice;	one	 that	 is	distinctive	 in	 its	
critical	attention	to	the	nature	and	influence	of	the	ego.	
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The	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	attempt	an	exegetical	work	within	the	Sufi	tradition	




The	 thesis	 contains	 three	main	 chapters.	 The	 first	 chapter	 is	 on	Virtue	 Ethics,	












Finally,	 it	 is	worthy	to	mention	that	 this	work	 intends	to	revive	the	primacy	of	
moral	 philosophy	 and	 proposes	 key	 routes	 that	 could	 lead	 humanity	 back	 to	 its	
goodness.	
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Chapter	1:	What	is	Virtue	Ethics?	
 
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 aim	 to	 identify	 the	essential	 features	of	Virtue	 Ethics	 so	 as	 to	
understand	how	it	is	to	be	distinguished	from	other	moral	theories,	Moreover,	I	aim	
to	explore	areas	of	tension	with	other	moral	theories.	










such	 traits	 based	 on	 the	 virtue	 ethical	 theoretical	 framework	 (Carr	 and	 Steutel,	
1999,	p.	5).	
One	 thing	 that	 differentiates	 VE	 from	 deontology,	 aretaic	 from	 deontic,	 is	 the	
predicate	used	 to	express	a	moral	 judgment.	Aretaic	 judgments	would	 include	 the	
concepts	 good,	 bad,	 courageous,	 unkind,	 hostile,	 etc.	 while	 deontic	 judgments	 in-
volve	concepts	limited	to	right,	obligatory,	wrong,	forbidden,	which	reflects	the	na-
ture	of	the	parameters	of	each	moral	position.	The	ultimate	goal	of	human	life	on	an	
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Aristotelian	version	of	VE	is	eudaimonia;	flourishing,	which	could	be	attained	by	the	
attainment	 of	 moral	 virtue	 (Han,	 2015).	 This	 is	 one	 of	 the	 unique	 notions	 of	 VE,	
which	 differs	 to	 deontology	 or	 consequentialism	 in	 that	 they	 are	 only	 concerned	
with	presenting	a	framework	that	identifies	moral	good	actions	from	others.	Aristo-
tle,	however,	attempted	to	not	only	bring	a	worked	out	moral	framework	but	rather	












larly	 appealing	 in	 contrast	 to	 competing	moral	 theories	 to	 it	 as	 it	 appeals	 to	 two	
types	of	people	 (1)	 those	who	are	 in	pursuit	of	holistic	and	existential	 truths,	 and	
how	they	link	that	with	morality	since	VE	offers	a	solution	for	leading	a	purposeful	
and	meaningful	 life	 that	 is	 in	pursuit	of	attaining	virtue	(2)	 those	who	are	not	 just	
rationally	driven	but	also	care	for	their	emotional	wellness	and	are	in	pursuit	of	liv-
ing	a	happy	life	that	is	in	accordance	with	morality.	
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It	is	also	worthwhile	to	note	that	the	move	from	hedonistic	to	eudaimonistic	ac-




term	satisfaction	and	fulfillment,	hence	the	raise	of	 interest	 in	exploring	 the	 flour-





An	 important	understanding	of	virtue	 is	 that	it	 is	a	state	or	disposition	(Greek:	
Hexis),	and	not	a	sort	of	mindless	habit	(Copp	and	Annas,	2006).	The	distinction	be-
tween	 habit	 and	 virtue	 is	 that	 a	 habit	 on	 its	 own	 has	 absolutely	 no	 active	 under-







                                                
1	For	Aristotle	this	is	a	“hexis	meta	logou”	,	that	is	a	“habit	with	reason.”	















“Not	only	does	 the	 irrational	 soul	need	 the	help	of	 the	 rational	 soul,	but	 in	
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an	action’s	moral	worth;	since	an	egoistic	motive	could	be	the	source	of	a	seemingly	
good	action	and	 it	 is	never	possible	 to	view	anything	except	 the	agent’s	 empirical	
deed	(Hassan,	2019,	p.	14).	

















ognize	 opportunities	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 higher	 ends	 or	 value	 goals.	 Aristotle	 be-
lieves	that	one	cannot	be	morally	virtuous	without	having	practical	wisdom,	and	at	
the	same	time	one	cannot	have	practical	wisdom	without	becoming	morally	virtu-
















cial	 scientists	 (Moshman,	 1995).	 The	 study	 showed	 that	 each	 of	 them	 showed	 a	
long-term	 commitment	 and	 disposition	 to	 act	 upon	 moral	 principles.	 One	 of	 the	




velopment,	but	 because	 it	 is	 a	matter	of	moral	 identity	 since	 these	 exemplars	 see	
themselves	in	moral	terms;	meaning	they	see	these	values	as	essential	to	who	they	
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are	and	what	they	need	to	do.	It	is	also	suggested	in	this	study	that	exemplars	show	

















(b)	The	 view	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 the	 agent	 to	 possess	 certain	 virtuous	
traits,	 even	 if	 they	 couldn’t	master	all	 virtues,	 and	 still	 be	 considered	
virtuous	in	respect	to	the	attained	ones.	
	











bituation,	which	 plays	 an	 important	 theme	 in	 this	 thesis:	 VE	 typically	 emphasizes	
that	virtues	can	be	taught	and	developed,	especially	through	habituation	(Aristotle,	
1999,	Book	II).	In	the	hope	of	acquiring	a	virtue,	the	agent	could	repeat	certain	ac-








of	 internal	 conflict	would	 not	 be	 considered	 to	 be	 genuinely	 virtuous,	 even	 if	 the	
moral	action	produced	was	aligned	with	the	agent’s	motivation.	This	should	not	be	a	




acter.	If	 the	agent	 is	virtuous	then	he	desires	 the	right	 thing	and	he	knows	how	to	
reach	the	right	thing.	While	if	the	agent	exhibits	non-virtuous	temptations	or	desires	
even	if	he	did	not	act	upon	them,	they	would	be	signs	for	the	agent’s	incompletion	of	
virtue	attainment.	Such	 critical	 details	 and	 accounts	of	 the	 character	and	morality	
are	unique	 features	of	VE	and	Sufism,	which	not	only	suggest	 their	great	harmony	
but	 also	 show	 how	 these	 traditions	 distinctively	 bring	 their	 moral	 framework	 in	
ways	that	are	not	found	in	other	moral	theories.	
Nonetheless,	it	should	be	noted	that	some	ethicists	in	the	contemporary	second-
ary	 literature	have	questioned	 the	uniqueness	of	VE	as	a	normative	 theory.	There	
are	two	camps	that	give	different	verdicts	regarding	whether	to	consider	VE	a	third	
moral	framework,	distinct	from	consequentialism	on	the	one	hand,	and	deontology	
on	the	other,	as	 for	example,	G.E.M.	Anscombe	and	Jason	Kawall	argue	 for	 the	dis-
tinctiveness	of	VE.	On	the	other	hand	ethicists	like	Martha	Nussbaum,	believe	that	it	
is	 just	another	 form	of	expressing	consequentialism	or	deontology.	But	Anscombe,	
famously	 for	defending	and	reviving	VE	 in	 the	mid-twentieth	century,	not	only	re-
fused	 to	accept	 that	VE	 is	 a	way	 to	express	deontology,	 she	 further	argued	 that	 it	
was	not	possible	to	make	sense	of	deontology	as	a	moral	framework	independent	of	
its	 relation	 to	a	divine	command	 theory,	 i.e.	without	believing	 in	God,	highlighting	
that	duty	and	obligation	are	residuals	of	Christian	thought	(Anscombe,	1958,	p.	4).	
Kawall	criticizes	a	deontological	 argument	that	defines	a	virtue	as	a	mere	disposi-
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tion	to	perform	one’s	duty,	and	described	this	as	“reductive	deontologism”	(Kawall,	
2009,	p	4).	He	offers	an	example	of	the	actions	of	someone	who	is	in	love	who	will	
have	actions	 flowing	 from	 this	 emotional	 state.	 It	wouldn’t	be	sensible	 to	describe	
this	person	as	having	a	disposition	to	perform	certain	actions	or	follow	specific	set	
of	rules.	This	analogy	gives	us	a	better	way	to	understand	how	VE	could	be	easily	














and	 training	 of	 passions,	 and	 that	he	 offers	 detailed	 analyses	 of	 some	 virtues	 and	
vices	 (Nussbaum,	 1999,	 p.	 165).	 Nussabaum	 lists	 three	main	 claims	 that	 are	 pro-
moted	by	the	defenders	of	VE,	which	are:	
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“A.	 Moral	 philosophy	 should	 be	 concerned	with	 the	 agent,	 as	well	 as	with	
choice	and	action.		
B.	Moral	philosophy	 should	 therefore	 concern	 itself	with	motive	and	 inten-













is	 not	moral	 to	 act	 upon	 anything	 but	 duty,	 which	 is	 the	 reason	 based	 universal	
moral	law	(Kant,	1998).	Hence,	the	general	claim	that	Kant’s	moral	philosophy	could	
go	 hand	 in	 hand	with	 VE	 is	mistaken,	 according	 to	 Kant	 himself.	 	 Secondly,	 Kant	
wouldn’t	agree	on	point	A,	since	he	believes	that	the	moral	law	is	the	only	reference.	
Like	Utilitarians,	virtue	 is	only	valuable	 for	Kant	 instrumentally:	 it	ought	 to	be	de-
veloped	because	it	helps	us	do	our	duty.	This	is	out	of	step	with	traditional	VE,	since	
VE	holds	virtues	are	good	for	their	own	sake.	Thirdly,	Kant	also	wouldn’t	agree	with	













Kantian	 views	 and	was	 about	 how	deontology	 in	 general	 can	work	with	VE.	 As	 a	
matter	of	fact,	as	the	paper	will	unfold,	it	will	show	that	Sufism	has	worked	out	this	
blend	between	deontology	and	VE	in	a	unique	manner.	





related	 experiences.	 	 Brian	Besong	 gave	 very	 focused	 efforts	 to	 demonstrate	 how	
asceticism	 is	 essential	 in	 VE	 as	 recognized	 by	 many	 philosophers	 as	 means	 for	
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reaching	virtue	(Besong,	2019).	He	also	used	empirical	research	to	draw	on	the	im-
portance	 of	 self-control	 as	 well	 as	 responded	 to	 criticisms	 of	 asceticism,	 one	 of	
which	 is	 that	 asceticism	 is	only	used	 for	religious	purposes.,	which	he	 claims	 isn’t	
quite	 the	case,	and	 that	 it	 is	considered	an	 integral	part	of	 acquiring	virtue.	There	
are	several	plausible	points	from	Besong	‘s	work	that	are	important	to	highlight	and	
digest	before	exploring	the	world	of	Sufism.	




this	 thesis	and	one	of	 the	 important	 themes	 in	Sufism,	which	also	proscribes	 con-
quering	one’s	 self	 in	order	 to	 reach	 virtue.	 Second	 is	 that	 there	are	 corporeal	 and	
incorporeal	 practices	of	 asceticism	 that	allow	 the	agent	 to	experience	more	 resili-
ence	in	submitting	to	pleasurable	or	irrational	desires	 that	stand	in	the	way	of	be-
coming	virtuous.	This	means	 that	what	asceticism	really	provides	 the	agent	 is	 the	
ability	 to	choose	according	to	the	agent’s	best	 judgment	 instead	of	acting	or	being	
affected	 by	 immoral	 or	 irrational	 desires.	Hence	 asceticism	 is	 not	 valuable	 for	 its	
own	sake,	but	only	morally	worthy	when	it	is	done	for	the	sake	of	reaching	virtue.	
Finally	an	important	note	that	will	be	elaborated	upon	later	in	more	detail,	one	that	
aligns	greatly	with	 the	 Sufi	paradigm	on	 the	 stages	of	 the	 self,	 is	 the	 focus	on	 the	
agent’s	experience	of	pain	as	a	result	of	being	pulled	in	opposing	directions	in	con-
texts	where	doing	what	is	pleasurable	and	doing	the	right	thing	are	contradictory.	







In	 this	 chapter	we	will	 explore	 in	 depth	 the	 holistic	 Sufi	 paradigm	 concerning	
morality,	the	purification	of	the	Ego,	and	the	strategy	and	methodology	of	reaching	
the	Sufi	goal:	reaching	“union	with	God”,	as	in	the	words	of	William	Chittick	who	is	
an	 interpreter	of	 classic	 Islamic	philosophical	 and	mystical	 literature,	may	also	be	
expressed	as	“realization	of	human	perfection”	or	“actualization	of	the	divine	image	
in	which	human	beings	were	 created”	 (Chittick,	2008,	p.	20).	As	 it	will	be	demon-
strated	in	the	ending	of	the	chapter,	virtue	could	mean	one	of	two	things	1)	an	iso-
lated,	 individual	 disposition	 or	 specific	 virtue	 or	 2)	 the	whole	 or	 sum	of	 all	 these	
‘specific’	virtues—whole	virtue.	In	this	chapter,	and	for	the	purpose	of	better	navi-
gation	within	the	Sufi	context,	we	shall	use	the	word	virtue	to	mean	the	‘specific	vir-
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An	Overview	on	Sufism		
There	is	no	common	agreement	between	Islamic	scholars	on	what	the	word	Su-
fism	 originally	 meant	 or	 literally	 means	 but	 rather	 they	 have	 discussed	 different	















chain	 that	 verifies	 the	 authenticity	 of	 the	 transfer	 of	 knowledge	 through	 verified	
means	(Chittick,	2008,	p.	28).	This	knowledge	could	either	be	related	to	theological	
content	that	is	concerned	with	rational	and	law	based	sciences	known	as	Knowledge	
of	 Shari’a	 (‘ilm	al-sharī‘a),	 or	 spiritual	 knowledge,	 known	 as	Knowledge	of	 Reality	
Page 20 of 86 
(‘ilm	al-ḥaqīqa)	 that	refers	 to	knowledge	of	God,	 that	could	be	transferred	through	
tarbiya,	moral	education	or	discipline	of	one’s	character	(Janssens,	2011,	p.	627).2	
This	brings	us	to	explaining	the	second	element,	which	is	the	Spiritual	one.	It	is	
what	 the	Sufi	 tradition	offers	 in	a	unique	way	as	an	eloquent	guide	 for	 those	who	
want	to	advance	in	the	spiritual	path	to	remove	the	barrier	and	obstacles	that	stand	
between	 the	murīd,	 the	 seeker	 of	 God,	 and	God.	 Al-Ghazālī’s	 testimonial	 in	 his	al-
Munqidh	min	al-Ḍalāl	(The	Deliverance	from	Error)	stated	that	he	acknowledged	that	





by	 hymn	 and	 mantra	 like	 remembrance	 (Dhikr)	 and	 contemplative	 reflective	
thought	activities	(Fikr)	(RRS).	The	Spiritual	domain	gives	comprehensive	theoreti-







                                                
2	See	also:	A.	Al-Ḥasanī,	(2002),	p.	272	
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and	 vigil	 are	 core	 for	 the	 advancement	 of	 spiritual	 flourishing	 (RRS,	 p.	 120).	 al-










Allah	 in	the	heart…	so	 it	is	from	this	light	 that	revelation	should	be	sought”	
(DFE	,	p.	30)	
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its	 installment	 in	a	 character,	 as	 in	 the	 case	of	VE.	 It	 is	hence	useful	 to	deploy	 the	






















the	 simplest	 forms	 of	 arguments	 that	 are	 essentially	 deduced	 and	 analyzed	 from	
theological	 references	 (RRS:	 2,	 Ch.	 2).	 He	 even	 clarified	 that	 the	 layman’s	 faith	 is	
stronger	and	better	rooted	than	the	mutakallim,	the	specialized	rational	theologian	
who	 engage	 in	 argumentation	 regarding	 proofs	 of	 God’s	 existence	 and	 is	 easily	
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criticizing	philosophy	as	a	 sum,	but	 in	actual	 fact	he	 is	merely	exposing	how	pure	
rational	thought	is	insufficient	to	spiritual	flourishing,	although	the	consideration	of	
ethics	and	other	principles	found	in	philosophy	could	be	beneficial	to	one’s	spiritual	
path.	 Also	 al-Ghazālī’s	 main	 criticism	 to	 philosophy	 is	 directed	 at	 metaphysical	
views,	which	hold	non-theological	contradictory	assumptions	regarding	divine	reve-
lation	and	truths.	In	fact,	al-Ghazālī	claims	that	political	and	moral	philosophy	were	
inspired	by	wisdom	 found	 in	 teachings	of	 ancient	prophets	and	 saints	who	are	or	
alike	to	Sufis	that	were	consumed	with	ascetic	practices	to	pursue	closeness	to	Allah	





phy	 in	 a	 traditional	manner,	 but	 rather	 suggests	 that	 the	 Sufi	 always	 holds	 philo-
sophical	 views	and	 insights	and	 has	 some	degree	of	 involvement	with	 philosophy	
(in	its	authentic	meaning	of	love	of	wisdom)	in	at	least	one	of	its	branches,	so	long	as	
they	are	aligned	with	the	ground	of	Islamic	theology.	 In	the	Sufi	tradition,	philoso-
phy	 in	the	sense	of	 ‘love	of	wisdom’,	 isn’t	at	all	divorced	from	religion,	 in	 fact	 it	 is	
core	in	the	spiritual	path	of	the	Sufi	to	involve	in	contemplative	and	reflective	think-
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ing	as	well	as	 to	explore	in	different	depths	the	secrets	of	morality,	aesthetics,	and	
Spiritual	 truths.	 Having	 love	 for	 wisdom	 in	 Sufism	 entails	 appreciation	 of	 divine	
knowledge	and	spiritual	truths,	an	attitude	that	is	important	in	the	advancement	of	
the	murīd	 in	his	quest	of	knowing	God	since	 ‘knowledge’	is	of	a	high	spiritual	rank	
(SA	 ,	 p.	 27).	 This	 hints	 to	 how	 the	 deontological	 account	 presented	 in	 the	 Islamic	
Shari’a	 can	 coincide	with	other	 accounts	 that	 are	 fixated	 on	 the	 flourishing	 of	 the	
soul.	
Al-Ghazālī	 gives	 a	 detailed	 account	 in	 the	 ‘Marvels	of	 the	Heart’	 book	 from	 the	
Iḥyā’,	on	the	ego	(RRS:	3);	 the	main	vices	of	man;	practices	and	treatments	 for	 the	





ego,	 soul	 (rūḥ)	 (RRS:	 3),	heart	 (al-qalb),	 and	 intellect	 (al-‘aql)	 as	different	parts	of	
the	human	each	with	its	own	spiritual	counterpart	and	essence.	For	the	purposes	of	
this	 study	we	will	 examine	 deeply	 al-Ghazālī’s	 analyses	 on	 the	 heart	 and	 the	 ego.	
The	heart,	explained	by	al-Ghazālī	as	the	most	important	organ	by	first	referencing	
to	 physical	 heart	 not	 just	 because	 it	 is	 served	 by	 all	 other	 organs,	 but	 most	 im-
portantly	 because	 its	 spiritual	 counterpart	makes	 it	 the	 only	knower	 of	 Allah	 and	
receiver	 of	 divine	 revelation	 and	 knowledge.	 A	 view	 that	 could	 be	 considered	 in-
spired	 by	 Avicenna	 who	 mentioned	 the	 body	 to	 be	 an	 instrument	 of	 the	 soul	






















                                                
3	See	https://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-ar/فسد/	
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plies	 in	 applying	 Shahada	 in	 the	 heart	 by	 negating	 and	 abandoning	 anything	 the	
heart	 is	 immersed	 in	or	attached	to,	whether	 it	be	ego	related	or	something	of	 the	





tion	of	 the	virtues	(taḥallī),	and	 finally	with	 chapters	on	 love	and	devotion	to	God	
(tajallī).	 This	 gives	 us	 answers	 to	 potential	 inquires	 regarding	whether	 it	 is	 suffi-
cient	 to	 remove	vices	 to	 reaching	virtue.	The	 removal	of	 vices	 leads	 to	 the	attain-
ment	of	some	virtues,	yet	not	all	virtues	are	reached	just	by	the	removal	of	the	vices.	
As	 is	demonstrated,	 the	 removal	of	 vices	 is	considered	to	be	a	 separate	 first	stage	
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Al-Ghazālī	gave	a	crucial	definition	of	al-nafs,	which	I	find	this	part	to	be	one	of	the	
most	critical	examinations	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	allows	us	to	uniquely	understand	the	
















morally	neutral	standpoint,	as	 it	will	be	further	discussed	that	it	 is	only	the	 imbal-
ances	and	excess	of	 these	potencies	 that	yield	vices	and	 immoral	behavior.	On	the	
other	hand	virtues	and	moral	behavior	are	found	in	balancing	these	potencies.	That	
gives	us	an	important	hint	that	within	the	Sufi	view,	humans	are	not	perceived	by	all	
Page 30 of 86 
means	as	 intrinsically	evil.	 In	actual	 fact	 it	 is	 the	mission	of	man’s	 journey	 to	God	











ness	 that	 in	 his	words	describe	 the	essence	of	 human	beings,	which	 says	 that	hu-
mans	are	intrinsically	good-natured	(Chittick,	2008,	p.	7).	Intrinsically	good-natured	
could	mean	that	we	have	innate	dispositions	to	cultivate	virtue,	or	that	we	already	
in	 a	 sense	 have	 such	 goodness	within.	 From	 al-Ghazālī’s	words,	 it	 could	 be	 noted	























This	 distinction	 resolves	 a	 seemingly	 problematic	 inconsistency	 in	 al-Ghazālī’s	
work	regarding	the	notion	of	 ‘greatness	of	 the	 soul’	 (kibar	al-nafs).	Typically	since	
al-Ghazālī’s	pronouncements	on	the	ego	that	it	needs	to	reach	humbleness,	it	is	ex-
pected	for	the	greatness	of	the	soul	to	be	a	vice	that	implies	arrogance	and	pride.	It	
                                                
4	Often	referred	to	as	world	of	‘atom’	(‘ālam	al-dharr)	or	world	of	‘covenant’	(‘ālam	al-mīthāq)	
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is	however	the	case	that	Abū	ʿAlī	Ahmad	ibn	Muhammad	ibn	Yaʿqūb	ibn	Miskawayh	
(932-1030)	 claimed,	 closely	 following	 Aristotle,	 that	 greatness	 of	 soul	 is	 a	 virtue	







tial	of	goodness	 that	 is	dignifying	to	man,	due	to	 its	 intrinsic	potential	of	knowing	




has	 been	 disclosed	 that	 the	 ego	 not	 only	 needs	 ‘smallness’	 but	 ‘breaking’	 and	 ‘re-
moval’.	 It	 then	follows	that	sighar	al-nafs	means	not	 the	smallness	of	 the	 ‘ego’,	but	
the	smallness	of	the	‘self’.	
The	Moral	Subject		




Page 33 of 86 
at	this	point	that	in	Sufism	there	is	a	strong	acknowledgment	of	the	theological	ties	
between	 the	soul	 and	divine	 command	 in	 Islam,	where	morality	 is	 essentially	em-
phasized	to	bring	the	murīd	closer	to	God	by	progressing	in	the	stages	of	the	self,	as	
will	be	explained	 in	 the	coming	 section.	What	 is	similar	 for	VE,	 especially	 through	
Aristotelian	notions,	is	the	acknowledgment	of	the	existence	of	the	soul.	But	Aristo-
tle’s	 epistemic	 approach	 to	 define	 such	 soul	 and	 identify	 its	 components	 remains	
questionable.	 Unlike	 the	 Sufi’s	 classification	 of	 the	 human’s	 components,	 Aristotle	
mentions	only	the	soul	as	the	non-material	form	within	the	human	(Aristotle,	2006).	
It	 is	 clear	 that	both	 traditions,	 Sufism	 and	VE,	 assume	relations	 between	morality	
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come	peacefully	obedient	and	become	free	from	disturbance	that	results	from	going	
against	 the	 desires.	 Therefore	 according	 to	al-Ghazālī’s	 account,	 slaying	 the	ego	 is	











ego	 (RRS,	 p.	 84).	 This	happens	 in	 the	 form	of	 sequential	 stages	 that	 represent	ad-
vanced	states	of	the	self;	meaning	that	the	second	state	is	higher	than	the	first	one	
and	the	third	state	is	higher	than	the	second	one.	It	could	be	inferred	that	struggle	
and	 inner	 combat	 happens	 only	 in	 the	 second	state	where	 the	 self	 and	ego	are	 in	
conflict	for	dominance.	This	battle	for	dominance	shouldn’t	be	thought	of	as	a	battle	




three	 (self,	 soul,	 and	heart),	 then	 it	 is	 associated	with	good	morality	and	 intellect.	








bravery.	And	the	goodness	of	 the	temptation	potency	and	 its	moderation	 is	
expressed	by	temperance/integrity	(‘iffa)…”	(RRS,	p.	86)	
	
He	 then	 continues	 to	 explain	 in	 the	 following	 lines	 that	 if	 the	 ‘anger	 potency’	
reached	 excess	 it	would	be	 called	 recklessness,	 and	 its	 deficiency	would	be	 called	
cowardice.	 Same	 with	 the	 ‘temptation	 potency’	 that	 its	 excess	 would	 lead	 to	
lust/gluttony	and	its	deficiency	would	lead	to	insensibility.	In	describing	the	golden	
mean	 considering	 these	 two	areas,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 al-Ghazālī	does	not	use	bravery	






the	 intellect	 in	 its	 release	 and	 its	 restrain.	 And	 by	 temperance	 (‘iffa)	 we	










sent	 two	main	cardinal	virtues	of	morality	along	with	 two	other	virtues	 that	don’t	
reside	in	 the	ego,	which	are	 justice	and	wisdom,	yet	are	needed	to	be	used	to	slay	
the	ego.	This	restates	an	 important	claim:	slaying	the	ego	 is	understood	as	merely	








                                                
6	See	page	30	
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reaching	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	is	separate	from	attaining	excellence	in	virtue	or	Sufi	
virtue.	
The	struggle,	 jihād,	 could	be	hence	conceptualized	as	a	result	of	 the	awakening	
or	determination	of	the	self	to	seize	control	over	the	levels	of	anger	and	temptation	
that	reside	within	the	individual	under	the	label	of	the	ego,	and	adjust	them	to	cour-







	 	 	 			Ego	 	 	 	 Self	
 
	 Anger	 	 Temptation	
 





potencies	 coming	 together;	 hence	when	we	 say	 ‘untamed	 ego’	we	mean	 the	 same	
thing	as	when	we	say	‘untamed	potencies’	that	operate	with	minimal	or	no	intellec-
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tual	or	moral	authority.	This	personified	ego	possibly	shares	a	metaphysical	reality	
corresponding	to	the	reality	of	 these	potencies	 that	compose	 it.	Which	means	that	
Sufis	 commonly	 portray	 the	 personified	 ego	 as	 an	 entity	 that	 behaves	 in	 certain	
ways	and	patterns,	when	referring	to	‘nafs’	in	the	ego	context,	like	for	example	com-
paring	 it	with	a	child	 that	behaves	 irrationally	or	an	entity	 that	 sneaks	to	 trick	 its	
possessor	into	vice.	Regardless	of	the	truth	of	that	persona,	we	now	know	that	its	off	
button	is	in	regulating	its	potencies.	Hence	it	is	clear	that	by	appropriately	regulat-
ing	the	 levels	of	 these	potencies,	 the	ego	diminishes	and	perishes	completely	with	
the	agent’s	attainment	of	moderation.	As	it	only	comes	to	existence	as	long	as	there	
are	 imbalances	occurring	 in	 the	 levels	 of	 the	 potencies,	 as	 per	 our	 analyses	 of	 al-
Ghazālī’s	 description	 of	 the	 ego,	 and	 should	 be	 tamed	 and	 fought	 then.	 The	 real	
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spiritual	 realities:	one	offering	a	more	 comprehensive,	cohesive,	 and	analytical	 ac-
counts	of	virtue	and	egoism.		
It	 is	 also	 inferred	 from	 the	 states	 of	 the	 self	 that	 the	 ego	 is	 unchallenged	 and	
obeyed	in	the	 first	state	since	there	 is	no	struggle	 that	 is	 taking	place,	and	 is	com-
pletely	at	rest	 in	 the	third	state	as	 the	self	 is	purified	 from	the	ego.	This	makes	us	
draw	 a	 similarity	 between	 the	 first	 and	 third	 stage	 that	 both	 share	 something	 in	
common,	which	is	that	there	 is	no	diminishing	of	 the	ego	that	 is	taking	place	in	ei-
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We	will	 use	 a	 few	 geometrical	 representations	 that	 could	 enable	 us	 to	 better	
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Manifestation	of	the	Ego	




As	 for	 the	x-axis,	 the	justification	of	 the	allocation	of	 the	nafs	ammāra	b-il-sū’at	
point	(-2,0)	 is	because	the	nafs	ammāra	b-il-sū’	is	 thought	to	be	a	negative	state	of	
the	self,	which	advances	to	actualize	better	states	represented	in	progression	along	
the	x-axis.	As	 for	 the	conceptualization	of	having	al	nafs	al	moutamena	 at	 the	 zero	
mark	symbolizes	two	things:	1)	the	end	of	the	negative	states	of	the	self	and	2)	the	
inauguration	of	infinitely	incrementing	higher	states	of	the	self	beyond	that	point.	
It	 could	 be	 inquired	whether	 if	 the	nafs	al-lawwāma	 is	 exclusive	 to	 point	B	 or	
not?	Or	 in	other	words,	where	does	 it	start	and	where	does	 it	end?	The	answer	 is	
simply	that	it	is	the	region	in	the	x-axis	that	starts	right	after	point	A	and	ends	right	
before	point	C	{A<x<C,	where	x	represents	al-nafs	al-lawwāma}.	Which	means	that	
maximum	ego	 level	 declines	 as	al-nafs	al-lawwāma	 advances	 till	 it	 reaches	 to	 the	





riving	 at	 al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna,	 and	 the	 self’s	 attainment	 of	 al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	
means	the	slaying	of	its	ego.	
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Another	 graph	 conceptualizes	 the	 change	 in	 resistance	 (against	 the	 self)	 or	
struggle	of	the	ego	in	relation	to	the	states	of	the	self	in	linear	and	non-linear	repre-
sentations.	It	is	worthy	to	note	that	these	two	representations	are	the	simple	possi-
ble	graphical	 illustrations	of	 three	known	points.	With	 the	x-axis	 representing	 the	
states	of	the	self	and	the	y-axis	representing	the	resistance	of	the	ego.	The	justifica-





y-axis.	As	 for	point	C	 (0,0)	 that	 represents	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	where	 the	ego	 is	
perished,	the	ego	is	not	in	resistance	since	the	ego	is	no	longer	manifested	hence	as-
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Resistance	of	the	
Ego	(Non-Linear)	
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The	zone	between	points	A	and	C	indicates	that	there	is	resistance	occurring	by	


































-3	 -2	 -2	 -1	 -1	 0	
Golden	Mean	
(Non	Linear)	


























C2:	 Al-nafs	 al-muṭma’inna	 requires	 two	 possible	 manifestations:	 part	 nafs	
muṭma’inna	or	whole	nafs	muṭma’inna	
 













a	 certain	 aspect,	 yet	 at	 the	 same	 time	 experience	 the	 other	 two	 states	 concerning	
other	areas.	I	shall	refer	to	this	contribution	as	unity	of	nafs,	as	it	is	inspired	from	the	
unity	of	virtue	account.	
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For	this	work	to	present	even	clearer	accounts	on	the	ontology	and	anatomy	of	
the	ego,	 a	map	will	be	presented	 in	the	 coming	chapter	 that	will	 classify	 the	vices	






A	 famous	 Hadith	 describes	 the	 prophet’s	 mission	 regarding	 morality	 is	 often	
translated	 as:	 “I	was	 sent	 to	 perfect/complete	 good/noble	moral	 character	 traits”	






erosities	of	morality”.	This	suggests	 that	morality	is	 ‘generous’	 (rich	with	things	to	








alone	morality.	 According	 to	 this	 interpretation,	 the	 prophet	 attained	 himself	 the	




use	 either	 ‘elimination’	 or	 ‘innovation’	 to	 describe	 his	 mission	 on	 morality.	 This	






Interestingly,	 morality	 in	 Arabic	 as	 defined	 by	 al-Ghazālī,	 is	 inherent	 in	 one’s	
character.	 Al-Ghazālī	 highlights	 that	 the	 word	 ‘khalq’8	describes	 one’s	 outer	 form,	
while	 ‘khuluq’	(which	 is	 the	same	root	word	and	consists	of	 the	exact	same	 letters	
but	with	 different	 accent),	describes	 one’s	 inner	 image	 (RRS,	 p.	 84).	He	 describes	
that	when	a	person	is	labeled	ḥasan	(good)	al-khuluq,	then	the	person	is	praised	for	
his	outer	image,	and	when	the	person	is	labeled	hasan	al	khuluq,	then	the	person	is	
                                                
8	‘Khalq’	also	means	‘creation’		
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praised	 for	his	 inner	 image,	 that	 is	his	morality.	He	 further	explains	 that	 a	human	
consists	of	body	and	soul,	 the	body	part	(outer)	is	perceived	with	sight	of	 the	eye,	
basar.	 As	 for	 the	 soul	 part	 (inner),	 it	 is	 perceived	 with	 insight	 (spiritual	 sight),	
baṣīra.	Morality	could	not	be	 ‘seen’	or	detected	by	the	physical	 ‘eye’,	 that	can	only	




Al-Ghazālī	 presents	 another	 key	 definition	 of	 morality	 that	 was	 translated	 in	
Hamid	Reza	Alavi’s	paper	as	“A	stable	state	of	 the	soul”	(Alavi,	2007,	p.	313).	Yet	 I	
don’t	 find	this	 translation	to	be	adequate	 for	choosing	 the	three	words	 “stable”	 to	
translate	rāsikha	as	 I	 believe	 that	 ‘rooted’	 is	more	 accurate	 to	 translate	 the	word.	
‘Form’	is	more	accurate	than	‘state’	to	translate	hay’a,	and	‘self,	as	described	through	
the	paper,	 is	more	 appropriate	 than	 ‘soul’	 to	 translate	nafs.	My	 translation	 for	his	
essential	 definition	 of	morality	would	be	 “A	 form	 that	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 self	 (nafs)”	
(RRS,	p.	84).	
He	continues	to	describe	that	from	this	‘rooted	form’:		
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Both	definitions,	 especially	 the	 second	one,	 already	assume	 the	 strong	 ties	 be-
tween	Sufism	and	VE.	Both	have	 the	 ‘character’	 as	 focal	 to	morality	and	 it	 is	 clear	
from	the	second	definition	how	it	exactly	describes	the	VE	view.	
Al-Ghazālī	 considers	 four	 cardinal	virtues	 to	 be:	wisdom,	bravery,	 temperance,	
and	 justice,	 these	 same	virtues	appear	 in	Plato’s	Republic	 (Parry,	1996,	p.	38).	All	
other	 virtues,	 according	 to	 al-Ghazālī,	 branch	 out	 from	 these	 cardinal	 ones.	 He	
claims	that	only	the	prophet	reached	perfection	in	moderation	regarding	these	four	
virtues	 (RRS,	 p.	 87).	We	 have	 previously	 explored	 in	 depth	 the	 virtues	 of	 bravery	
and	temperance	since	they	are	directly	linked	with	the	thesis’	main	theme,	as	their	
attainment	is	a	direct	manifestation	of	slaying	the	ego.	As	for	wisdom,	defined	by	al-
Ghazālī	 as	 the	awareness	of	distinguishing	 right	 from	wrong	actions,	 it	 too	has	an	
underlying	 potency	 that	 needs	 to	 reach	moderation	 for	 this	 virtue	 to	 be	 attained.	
This	potency	is	 ‘knowledge’	(‘ilm)	potency.	Justice,	however,	is	the	only	trait	that	is	

























them	 together	according	 to	 the	main	potency	 that	 is	 related	 to	 the	 corresponding	
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The	12	vices	are:	
• Lack of regulation of anger 
o Pride and arrogance (kibr wa ghurūr) 
o Self Admiration (‘ujb) 
o Jealousy (ḥiqd wa ḥasad) 
o Stinginess (bukhl) 
• Lack of regulation of temptation 
o Food and sexual desires (kasr al shahwatayn) 
o Love of world (ḥub al-dunya) 
o Love for wealth (ḥub al-māl) 
o Love of status and fame (ḥub al-jāh) 
o Ostentation (Riyā’) 







that	 could	 seemingly	 not	 fit	 such	 outline,	 yet	 here	 are	 a	 couple	 of	 examples	 that	
would	 demonstrate	 how	 they	would	 still	 be	 linked	 to	 these	 fundamental	 vices.	 A	
vice	such	as	cowardice	is	considered	to	be	the	lack	of	bravery	(Aristotle,	1998,	Book	
II:	8),	and	al-Ghazālī	stated	that	the	regulation	of	the	potency	of	anger	leads	to	the	









sires	 as	 the	 direct	manifestation	 of	 lack	 of	 regulation	 of	 temptation.	 Yet	 again,	 he	
didn’t	address	lack	of	regulation	of	 temptation	in	the	same	way	he	did	with	anger.	
This	was	the	main	alteration	of	my	 two	amendments	to	 the	map,	 that	 I	 added	the	
vice	of	lack	of	regulation	of	temptation	as	to	balance	the	one	with	the	lack	of	regula-
tion	of	anger.	Similar	to	considering	anger	as	a	disposition	that	needs	regulation	and	
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These	two	vices	are	each	considered	as	vices	of	 their	own,	rather	than	only	re-




















treatment,	 like	 the	 doctor	wouldn’t	 ignore	 the	 temperature	 rise	 and	would	 try	 to	
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treat	 the	 patient	 for	 the	 underlying	 disease.	 The	 doctor	 however	 should	 treat	 the	
temperature	rise	and	treat	the	underlying	disease	as	well.	Analogously,	treatment	of	













So	 resolving	the	potency	vices	would	be	 insufficient	 to	reach	moderation	of	 the	
potencies	of	the	ego.	This	is	a	clear	distinguishing	element	(the	core	vices	and	its	re-
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should	only	be	permissible	in	a	way	that	aligns	with	the	intellect	and	the	Islamic	law	
(shari’a)	in	two	scenarios:		
(1)	When	deprivation	of	 the	basic	necessities	of	 the	person	occurs;	 such	as	
food,	shelter,	clothes,	and	health		






according	to	al-Ghazālī	 is	 to	remove	the	 love	 for	 these	things,	which	suggests	how	
the	 core	vices	are	 intertwined	and	are	essential	 to	 reaching	 regulation	 for	 the	po-
tency	vices	and	the	whole	potencies.	
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The	same	thing	applies	 to	pride,	as	 the	prophet	said,	 “He	who	possesses	at	his	
heart	 the	weight	of	one	atom	of	pride	will	not	enter	heaven	 (Jannah)”.	This	direct	










path	 towards	 moral	 perfection	 is	 not	 found	 in	 withdrawal	 from	 society	 (Bucar,	
2018,	p.	214).	While	the	isolation	and	demise	of	attachment	to	dunya	is	the	only	re-
quired	notion	to	be	applied	to	 the	heart	of	 the	murīd	 not	 to	his	physical	practices.	
The	murīd	 is	 encouraged	 to	actively	engage	with	 the	 society	 and	worldly	dealings	
like	trading,	fighting	injustice,	helping	the	needy,	etc.	While	it	is	undeniable	that	iso-











ty	 is	a	result	of	bravery11,	 that	 is	why	stinginess	 is	related	to	the	potency	of	anger	
since	anger	is	related	to	the	disposition	of	bravery,	as	discussed	earlier.	The	relation	




In	 Iḥyā’	he	also	talks	about	both	as	 two	separate	vices	yet	 they	share	the	same	
section	and	title	in	the	book,	which	makes	him	consider	them	both	as	a	sort	of	‘two	
faces	of	the	same	coin’	and	account	them	as	the	same	vice	in	his	summary,	forty.	







                                                
11	al-Ghazālī,	“Iḥyā’	‘Ulūm	al-Dīn”,	p.	87	
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Al-Ghazālī	 suggests	 ‘remedies’	 and	ways	 to	 cure	 from	 all	 the	mentioned	 vices,	
except	for	lack	of	regulation	of	temptation	since	he	didn’t	identify	it	as	a	vice	of	its	
own.	They	mainly	involve	contemplation	(fikr),	remembrance	(dhikr),	and	physical	




thought	 process.	 Like	 conversing	 with	 a	 child,	 a	 theme	 that	 often	 occurs	 by	 Sufi	
preachers	who	 resemble	 the	nafs	 (ego)	as	a	 child,	when	acting	and	behaving	 irra-
tionally	but	needs	rational	and	wise	intervention	by	his	caretaker.	Reason	and	justi-
fication	are	practiced	using	fikr	that	potentially	influences	the	behavior	and	the	ac-









                                                
12	Wells,	Adrian	and	Peter	Fisher.	Treating	Depression:	MCT,	CBT,	and	Third	Wave	Therapies.	West	Sussex,	Eng-
land:	Wiley	Blackwell,	2016;2015;.	–	p	236	
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one	 the	 favour	 of	worshipping	 Him	 and	 thanking	Him,	whereas	 others	 are	
deprived	of	 this;	 and	 this	deprivation	was	not	due	 to	 some	previous	 sin	or	




will	 I	do	 if	 these	 bounties	 upon	me	 are	 only	 temporary	and	 deceiving,	 and	
will	eventually	lead	to	punishment	and	harm	to	my	life?”	(FFR,	p.	115)		
 
Dhikr	 is	 important	 too	 in	 Sufism	since	 it	 acts	 like	a	 spiritual	practice	 that	pro-
vides	 the	murīd	with	 spiritual	 aid	needed	 in	 overcoming	 the	vices.	Dhikr	 could	be	
interpreted	as	the	remembrance	of	the	abovementioned	related	fikr	and	intellectual	
concepts,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 affirmations	 given	 to	 the	 self.	 This	 technique	 is	 also	 en-

















Al-Ghazālī	 points	 out	 a	 duality	 between	 the	 physical	 limbs	 and	 the	 tongue	
(jawāriḥ)	 and	 the	 heart	 (RRS,	 p.	 94).	 This	 could	 be	 understood	 as	 addressing	 the	





the	actions	of	 the	 jawāriḥ	 and	 is	 always	produced	out	of	 this	disposition	or	virtue	
(SA,	p.	97).	This	is	in	alignment	with	the	notion	of	Islamic	commands	and	teachings	
that	very	critically	consider	and	account	for	harmonious	adjustments	of	body,	intel-
lect,	and	heart	as	 to	reach	union	with	God.	This	 tripartite	classification	 is	 tied	to	a	
famous	Hadith,	where	 the	angel	Gabriel	demonstrated	the	 spiritual	 reality	of	such	
classification	through	his	conversation	with	the	prophet	(Chittick,	2009,	p.	4).	This	is	
to	highlight	 the	presence	of	 the	 link	between	 the	actions	of	 the	physical	body	and	
one’s	spiritual	state	since	the	divine	command	that	requires	attunement	of	the	body,	
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In	 Sufism,	 there	 are	 three	main	motives	 for	worshipping	 Allah.	 This	 threefold	
definition	 of	 the	 states	 of	 the	 intention	 is	 attributed	 to	 the	 early	 Sufi	 Ma`ruf	 al-
Karkhi	 (d.	 815)	 by	 Shaykh	 `Abd	 al-Rahman	 al-Sufuri	 (d.	 1488)	 in	 his	 "Nuzhat	 al-
Majalis”	(Saffuri,	2013).	
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in	return	of	the	worship	like	paradise	or	any	other	pleasure.	The	third	and	highest	
rank	of	worship	is	the	one	that	is	of	the	free	(aḥrār),	and	that	is	the	worship	of	Allah	




the	 three.	Even	 if	 the	 first	 two	 types	are	considered	 to	be	 immoral,	 they	are	suffi-










I	 would	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 normal	 for	 a	murīd	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 his	 journey	 to	




der	 to	 slay	 it	 and	 reach	moral	 excellence.	 It	 is	not	 sensible	 that	one	 should	be	ex-
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pected	 to	experience	 sincere	 love	 for	Allah	when	the	person	 is	still	suffering	 from	











‘more’,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 prophet.	 Given	 that	 he	 is	 believed	 by	 the	 Sufis	 to	
have	reached	human	perfection,	it	is	certainly	the	case	that	he	reached	perfection	in	
motivation	for	worship.	The	prophet	acknowledged	his	chief	rank	of	spirituality	and	
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lowing	God’s	will.	This	retells	the	initial	claim	presented	in	this	thesis	of	the	unique	
blend	 that	 Sufism	 achieves	 between	 deontology	 and	VE.	 If	 it	 was	 the	 case	 that	 at	
some	point	divine	rituals	are	no	longer	necessary	for	the	agent	who	reached	virtue,	
like	praying	for	example,	then	the	prophet	would	have	stopped	doing	it.	It	might	be	
the	 case	 however	 for	 some	 ‘extra’	 ascetic	 practices	 that	 are	 not	 obligatory	 for	all	
Muslims	to	follow	and	were	assigned	for	the	agent	to	overcome	certain	vices	to	be	no	











feeling	 bad	 about	 ourselves,	 is	 this	 considered	 to	 be	 a	moral	 intention?	Most	 im-
portantly	we	should	ask,	is	it	even	possible	to	do	any	kind	of	action	without	any	sort	
of	 personal	 gain?	 Because	 it	 seems	 like	 even	when	 someone	 is	motivated	 to	 help	
others	without	wanting	anything	in	return,	they	are	doing	so	because	they	‘want’	to	
be	good	and	do	the	right	thing.	Doesn’t	this	too	count	as	a	selfish	intention?	














person	 is	 serving	 their	 nafs,	 the	 ‘ego’	 part,	 as	 the	 person	 is	 consciously	 seeking	








uniting	with	 the	 only	 perfect	 being,	 God.	 So	 it	 is	 not	 immoral	 for	 the	 self	 to	need	
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seeking	union	with	God,	in	fact	it	is	its	genuine	purpose	that	it	needs	to	fulfill.	In	ac-
tual	fact,	what	could	be	argued	as	immoral	from	the	Sufi	paradigm	is	claiming	or	as-
suming	 that	 a	 self	 is	 not	 in	 need	 of	 its	 Lord.	 
	
 
“O	 people,	 it	 is	 you	 surely	who	 are	 in	 need	 of	 Allah,	 and	 Allah	 is	 the	 self-
sufficient,	immensely	praiseworthy”	[35:15]	
	


























shahada	and	 appreciation	 of	 God’s	 oneness.	 And	 no	 because	 the	 framing	of	 ‘using	
people	as	means’	 could	connote	dehumanization	or	degradation	of	human’s	worth	








what	 we	 defined	 as	 ‘ego’.	 It	 is	 as	 if	 we’re	 saying	 (selfish=egotistical),	 and	 (self-
less=non	egotistical).	






























tioned	 in	the	 first	chapter	also	that	moral	exemplars	are	essential	 in	VE	given	that	
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As	we	have	 investigated	 throughout	 the	 thesis,	 al-Ghazālī	 clearly	makes	 use	of	
the	principle	of	the	golden	mean.	Which	is	one	of	the	known	doctrines	addressed	by	
classical	philosophers	and	mainly	Aristotle.	al-Ghazālī	also	brings	theological	refer-






comes	with	one’s	 advancement	 towards	 their	purpose.	 In	Aristotelian	VE	 the	pur-
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pose	of	man	is	reaching	happiness,	eudaimonia,	while	in	Sufism	the	purpose	is	union	
and	knowledge	of	God.	If	we	bring	together	the	two	accounts,	it	is	not	implausible	to	
claim	 that	 true	 eudaimonia	 is	 reached	with	 union	with	 God.	 Eudaimonistic	 virtue	






































parts	of	 the	self	 come	 together	 in	 the	 light	of	what	has	been	disclosed.	The	model	
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al-muṭma’inna	suggesting	that	the	nafs	contains	only	the	self,	the	second	represents	
al-nafs	ammāra	b-il-sū’	suggesting	that	the	nafs	contains	only	the	ego,	and	the	third	
represents	al-nafs	al-lawwāma	 suggesting	 that	 the	nafs	 contains	both;	 the	 self	 and	
the	ego.	The	green	arrows	denote	pure	good	influence,	the	black	arrows	denote	pure	
bad	 influence,	 and	 the	 red	 arrows	 denote	 combat	 type	 of	 influence	 that	 could	 be	










Page 74 of 86 
	
	
Page 75 of 86 










The	body	 is	hence	 respondent	 to	 the	nafs,	 nonetheless	 it	 can	 influence	 the	nafs	 in	
two	ways	 1)	 through	 bodily	 cravings	and	 desires	 or	2)	 through	 ascetic	 and	 pious	
practices.	 The	 model	 suggests	 another	 special	 direct	 relationship	 that	 was	 men-
tioned	 in	 earlier	 sections	 between	 the	 body	 and	 the	 heart,	 as	 referred	 to	 by	 al-
Ghazālī	in	his	demonstration	of	the	ties	between	jawāriḥ	and	the	heart.	The	final	re-
lation	 is	 the	one	between	 the	nafs	 and	 the	heart,	which	 is	 essential	 to	 capture	 the	
analyses	of	al-Ghazālī’s	description	of	 the	two	parts.	The	nafs,	ego	dominant,	could	
either	corrupt	 the	heart	and	cause	 it	 illness,	or	it	could	reach	purification	have	the	
heart	spread	its	good	and	virtuous	moral	intentions	and	actions.	It	within	the	ties	of	















We	presented	a	 threefold	view	 to	understand	Sufism,	which	highlighted	 its	 in-







Hence,	 humans	 are	 intrinsically	 good	 yet,	 they	 have	 an	 inner	 ‘evil	 force’	 that	 re-
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The	Anatomy	of	the	Nafs	and	the	Ego	
Through	careful	exegetical	efforts	to	al-Ghazālī’s	beginning	chapter	of	Marvels	of	
the	Heart	of	 the	 Iḥyā’,	we	were	able	 to	properly	distinguish	between	 the	 two	dis-
closed	meanings	of	 the	nafs	that	allowed	us	 to	understand	 the	difference	between	
what	we	referred	to	as	self	and	ego.	This	separation	allowed	for	clearer	analyses	and	
resolutions	 concerning	 references	 to	 the	 nafs	 and	 critically	 review	 associations	
linked	to	 it.	Moreover,	we	drew	more	examinations	to	 identify	 the	anatomy	of	 the	













mans	 are	 always	 in	 need	 since	 their	 ‘needy’	 and	 ‘imperfect’	nature.	 If	 the	 interest	
feeds	the	ego,	then	we	could	refer	to	this	as	‘selfish’,	and	this	is	immoral.	On	the	oth-








reward.	We	 could	 realize	 that	 they	 are	 valid	within	 the	 Islamic	 shari’a	 given	 that	
these	two	motivations	are	 feeding	 the	 ‘self’,	 since	 the	way	to	actualize	 the	ends	of	





























anger	 and	 temptation	 potencies,	 therefore	 the	 way	 to	 slay	 the	 ego	 is	 to	 achieve	
moderation,	not	 elimination,	 to	 the	 potencies	 of	 anger	 and	 temptation	 (SA,	 p.	 80).	
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Potency	and	Core	Vices:	Between	Moderation	and	Purification		
What	 I	 consider	 as	 another	 prime	 contribution	 for	 this	work,	 this	 explanation	










































this	paper	was	 concerned	with	 theoretical	 critical	 examinations	 of	 the	 self	 from	 a	
focused	angle,	more	theoretical	 inquiries	 could	be	explored	 like	 relations	between	
aesthetics	and	morality,	morality	and	wellbeing,	as	well	as	more	accounts	on	the	self	
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from	different	scholars	and	philosophers	of	both	traditions.	Furthermore,	this	work	
could	inspire	empirical	efforts	and	studies	that	could	assess	the	practicality	of	these	
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